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Like a Radio Left On / on the 
Outskirts of Identical Cities
Living (with) Fradenburg 
Eileen A. Joy 
We are beings who can neither live nor die 
without artful signification. 




. . . obscure / forces are at work / like a ra-
dio left on / on the outskirts of / identical 
cities. 
Ben Lerner, “Doppler Elegies” 
Like a radio left on, in the poet Ben Lerner’s par-
lance, on the outskirts of identical cities—and 
also, like the strains of a Lushlife Project down-
tempo “Budapest Eskimos” soundtrack emanat-
ing from a diamond mine—Aranye Fradenburg’s 
work has operated as a groovy and “obscure 
force” in medieval studies, and also in the human-
ities more broadly, for the past 20 or so years as a 
powerful and palpably explicit influence, first, 
upon work in Middle English literary (especially 
Chaucer) studies, especially those inflected by 
psychoanalytic, symptomatic, and “discontinu-
ist”/non-alteritist historicist approaches to the 
Middle Ages. And second, her work has operated 
as a potent and insistent voice on the arts of liv-
ing, on eudaimonia (flourishing), on the im-
portance of pleasure/enjoyment (in its lighter and 
darker valences), on sentience/sensation, the feel-
ing arts, on techniques of living, and care of the 
self. On the linguistic level, her work has richly 
explored what she calls the “living on”-ness of 
the always-traveling, transitive, open-ended, and 
non-linear signifiers and processes of signification 
that enable (and sometimes disable) the inter-
subjective formations between various actors, 
living and dead, past and present, so crucial to 
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our desires, to our sufferings and passions, to our 
ability to affiliate with and relate to others, and 
thus, to living our shared lives, for better and 
worse. And it must be noted, too, that one of the 
“obscure forces” that Lerner speaks of in his 
“Doppler Elegies” (in addition to death and ca-
tastrophe) is love, a subject which has played no 
small role in Fradenburg’s intellectual, and I 
would also say, political-humanist concerns. One 
could go further and say that, like Lerner, Fraden-
burg has been our scholarly poet of the “obscure 
forces” at work, not only in our university profes-
sions, but in the personal lives that can never be 
completely disentangled from that thing we call 
“work.” 
Fradenburg has been a hero of mine for a 
long while now for insisting, over and over again 
throughout her writings, that in all times and 
places we misunderstand ourselves, and there-
fore, unknowing—and the self-fictionalizations 
(some constructive, some destructive) predicated 
upon that unknowing—have to be taken into ac-
count, whether we are studying the past or just 
trying to understand ourselves and our own expe-
riences. As she put it so eloquently in her ma-
gesterial book Sacrifice Your Love, with regard to 
medieval studies, we “cannot confine the work of 
knowing the Middle Ages to replicating, however 
hopelessly and/or heroically, medieval cultures 
self-understandings. We also should explore how 
medieval cultures, like all others, may have mis-
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understood themselves.”1 And with regard to our 
own self-understandings, and in a way that is res-
onant with many of the discourses circulating in 
the university today under the aegis of object-
oriented philosophies and various strains of 
post/humanist thought, Fradenburg wrote in the 
same book, 
. . . the effect of subjectivity is produced 
by the interplay of insentience with sen-
tience. 
The telescopes that help us see the 
stars, the buildings that house the shelters 
that are our bodies, are insentient; and yet 
we extend sentience through them. But 
the more we make the machines and 
products that extend subjectivity into the 
world, the more insentience is part of us, 
or we are part of it. Forces are at work 
within us that do not “mean” anything; 
parts of ourselves cannot account for 
themselves. The work cannot account for 
itself, or disclose anything about itself, or 
even be questioned.2 
This excerpt is part of a much longer and very 
complex discussion having to do with forms of 
alienation produced by labor, modes of produc-
1 L.O. Aranye Fradenburg, Sacrifice Your Love: Psychoa-
nalysis, Historicism, Chaucer (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2002), 77–78. 
2 Fradenburg, Sacrifice Your Love, 13. 
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tion (scholarly and artistic), aesthetics, courtly 
love, desire, libidinal economies, the Law, enjoy-
ment, sacrifice/loss, political ethics, and communi-
ty, and I can’t do justice to all of that here. In any 
case, Fradenburg’s theoretical project in this book, 
especially with regard to, say, Chaucer studies and 
medieval chivalric literature and culture more 
broadly (in its broadest temporal dimensions, 
then to now), is well-known and registered across 
a vast array of scholarship within medieval studies 
that has been undertaken under this book’s tute-
lage. 
My own continual return(s) to the passages 
cited above have more to do with my own inter-
est in and use of Fradenburg’s thinking, which, of 
unconscious necessity or intention, is highly idio-
syncratic and personal. Thus, for me, these pas-
sages have long operated as watch-phrases for 
my own work, where I have striven to always keep 
in mind the unavoidable blind spots and “obscure 
forces” of everyone’s understanding of every-
thing, including ourselves. Scholarship of medie-
val literature, or any literature, really, for me, be-
comes a valuable project of tracing productive 
errancies and sites of incoherence and crafting 
creative critical approaches that, in Eve Sedg-
wick’s memorable formulation, aim to be “addi-
tive and accretive,” desiring “to assemble and 
confer plenitude on an object [such as a text or 
textual object or author-object] that will then have 
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resources to offer an inchoate self.” 3  This has 
something to do as well with what Bryan Reynolds 
has called a transversal poetics that defy “the 
authorities that reduce and contain meanings,” 
and also seek to “understand and empower fugi-
tive elements [in texts and other artifacts, and in 
particular spaces] insofar as doing so generates 
positive experiences.” 4  And this sort of work 
might be crucial for the future, if we agree with 
Frandeburg (and I do) that, 
To be able to anticipate, plan, project a fu-
ture or into a future, we have to not know 
for sure, because we have to suspend 
judgment even while exercising it, know-
ing that we don’t know (everything). Eth-
ics—and ultimately psychoanalysis—
emerges from a willing of this suspension, a 
paradoxical knowing of non-knowing.5 
3 Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, “Paranoid Reading and Re-
parative Reading; or, You’re So Paranoid, You Probably 
Think This Introduction is About You,” in Sedgwick, ed., 
Novel Gazing: Queer Readings in Fiction (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 1997), 27–28. 
4  Bryan Reynolds, “Transversal Poetics and Fugitive 
Explorations: Theaterspace, Paused Consciousness, 
Subjunctivity, and Macbeth,” in Transversal Enterprises 
in the Drama of Shakespeare and His Contemporaries: 
Fugitive Explorations (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2008), 7 [1–26].	  
5  Aranye Fradenburg, “(Dis)continuity: A History of 
Dreaming,” in The Post-Historical Middle Ages, ed. 
Elizabeth Scala and Sylvia Frederico (New York: Pal-
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In relation to my own current work on Fou-
cault’s late writings on “care of the self,” I have 
been returning (a lot) recently to Fradenburg’s 
2002 book Sacrifice Your Love, where I have been 
struck both by how apropos to our moment and 
compelling this book still is and also by how 
Fradenburg’s entire oeuvre seems to continuously 
circle back (with important renovations of 
thought) to this earlier book’s project to draw 
attention to the important inter-relations between 
embodiment and signification, between pleasure 
and virtue (where “virtue” is seen to have some-
thing to do with world-building), between subjec-
tivity and Otherness, and between art and what 
she calls, in her essay “Living Chaucer” (and fol-
lowing the biological sciences) the “living pro-
cess.”6 It feels timely to me, therefore, to spend 
some time now thinking about Fradenburg’s tra-
jectory of thought over the past ten years or so, 
especially as it culminates, or expresses itself, in 
this important (and moving) essay, which originat-
ed as the Biennial Chaucer Lecture at the meeting 
of the New Chaucer Society in Siena, Italy in July 
2010. 
I offer one cautionary note here, therefore, to 
say that I am not attempting in this brief Preface 
(which is a also a tribute, or call it a love letter) to 
offer a comprehensive account of Fradenburg’s 
whole body of work, nor to assess all of its merits 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
grave Macmillan, 2009), 96 [87–115]. 
6 L.O. Aranye Fradenburg, “Living Chaucer,” Studies in 
the Age of Chaucer 33 (2011): 64 [41–64]. 
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(of which there are many) in relation to the larger 
field of medieval studies. Here I merely celebrate 
the originality and importance of a scholar who 
has urged me to think, and also to feel, different-
ly—about my field, yes, but more importantly, 
about the world in which I live. Over the years, I 
have come to value and to gather close to me, 
with a certain intense ardor, the work of scholars 
who have helped me, not just to think, but to live 
more creatively and more mindfully, and in this 
sense, Fradenburg joins Sara Ahmed, Zygmunt 
Bauman, Lauren Berlant, Jane Bennett, Leo Ber-
sani, Kathleen Biddick, Judith Butler, John Ca-
puto, Thomas Carlson, Jeffrey Cohen, Michel de 
Certeau, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Car-
olyn Dinshaw, Michel Foucault, James Earl, Cary 
Howie, George Kateb, Anna Kłosowska, Jonathan 
Lear, Emmanuel Levinas, Michael Edward Moore, 
Martha Nussbaum, Bill Readings, Joan Retallack, 
Claude Romano, Eve Sedgwick, and Simone Weil 
as writers who always hover nearby in my study. 
This list is highly personal, and of course I admire 
and am influenced by many scholars beyond the-
se, but these authors stand out for providing to 
me what, for lack of a better term, I will call my 
spiritual reservoir, comprising my scholar-gypsy 
companions. 
Some of the scholars in this list also stand out 
even further for their attention to and care for the 
role of the humanities and the university, and of 
creative thought more generally, in relation to 
personal and social life, and thus they have also 
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been crucial to me and others in relation to the 
heterotopic and desiring-assemblage projects of 
the BABEL Working Group.7 Fradenburg, along 
with Bennett, Bersani, Nussbaum, and Readings, 
is particularly noteworthy in this regard.8 When 
reading Fradenburg closely, no matter what the 
specific texts or subjects under close scrutiny 
(Chaucer’s Legend of Good Women, the Knight’s 
Tale, Troilus and Criseyde, etc.), what she seems 
to always be talking about is something she says 
more explicitly in her essay, “Group Time: Catas-
trophe, Survival, Periodicity”—that “enjoyment is 
the matrix of knowledge, and knowledge is not 
diminished thereby.” Further, “Interpretation and 
explanation are activities central to libidinal struc-
turation and vice versa. . . . We thereby reclaim 
our technical work [the humanities] as the work of 
desire, and desire as that which makes the 
world.”9  
Fradenburg has become one of our most im-
portant advocates for the importance of the “lib-
eral arts” (and of creativity, confabulation, and 
play, more particularly) to personal and more 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 See BABEL Working Group at: http://www.babelwork 
inggroup.org. 
8 Especially now that she has published Staying Alive: A 
Survival Manual for the Liberal Arts (Brooklyn: punctum 
books, 2013). 
9 L.O. Aranye Fradenburg, “Group Time: Catastrophe, 
Survival, Periodicity,” in Time and the Literary, ed. Karen 
Newman, Jay Clayton, and Marianne Hirsch (New York: 
Routledge, 2002), 232 [211–238]. 
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broadly social “thriving” and thus her recent es-
say, “Living Chaucer” (cited just above) feels like 
both the consummate culmination of her career’s 
various theoretical trajectories thus far, while it 
also offers (within the context of her more recent 
forays into neuroscience and evolutionary biolo-
gy) a striking and enlivening departure for a cou-
ple of reasons: first, because she moves closer 
than she has in previous work to embracing the 
value and necessity of shared minds (and thus, for 
all of their precariousness and dangers, somatic-
affective community-assemblages). And second, 
because she also articulates more forcefully than 
she has before that literature/language is not only 
a signalling system that only-always defers, or 
devolves, to other signalling systems, which are 
therefore in a continual Derridean slippage that, 
perhaps, never admits of a Real, or is always 
pointing to the ways in which language can only 
ever be falling away from that Real (blah blah 
blah, I’m so tired of and bored by these theories 
of lack/non-coincidence between language and 
everything else), but rather, that language and 
the literary arts may actually have the power to 
change history, and even more so, possesses a 
presence that is not negligible with regard to how 
we are affected by the past (or even to how we 
understand and negotiate our “selves” and our 
experiences in the present). As Fradenburg her-
self puts it in “Living Chaucer,”  
undead life seems more apt a description 
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of the signifier’s mode of existence (as 
Derrida himself thought) than does simple 
absence or nonexistence. I wrote in Sacri-
fice Your Love about this form of ‘‘being-
as-signifier’’: given how susceptible we are 
to the signifier’s designs, there is more 
connectedness than we think between liv-
ing subjects and dead letters. Nature’s 
signifiers vary in their realizations, but 
something, a shape, insists.10 
 
There is some resonance here with what Anna 
Kłosowska writes in Queer Love in the Middle 
Ages, that, 
 
all fiction corresponds to an absolute reali-
ty—not of existence, but of desire that 
calls fiction into being, performed by the 
authors and manuscript makers; and con-
tinuing desire for it performed by the rea-
ders, a desire that sustains the book’s ma-
terial presence across the centuries. That 
desire is incorporated in an existence. It is 
the backbone of an identity. It is an essen-
tial part of the bundle of motives that lie 
behind all that the body does. A part es-
sential because it is retrievable, but also 
because it is privileged: art reveals more of 
life than life does.11 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Fradenburg, “Living Chaucer,” 44. 
11  Anna Kłosowska, Queer Love in the Middle Ages 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 7. 
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I am reminded of when I was at University Col-
lege Dublin in June of 2009 for a 3-day seminar, 
organized by Michael O’Rourke and Noreen Giff-
ney, devoted to the oeuvre of Leo Bersani.12 On 
the first day, when we were revisiting the span of 
Bersani’s writings prior to his then-current book 
Intimacies, co-authored with Adam Phillips, at one 
point, I got extremely excited during the discus-
sion of Bersani and Ulysse Dutoit’s essay on Ter-
ence Malik’s film The Thin Red Line, an essay I 
absolutely love and have made use of in my own 
scholarship numerous times, 13  and one of the 
seminar’s participants said something to me that, 
in my memory of it, went something like this, 
“But, Eileen, why are you getting so excited 
about this? After all, we’re talking about a text, 
and what we do is talk about texts, and we read 
theory to see what we can do with it in relation to 
texts, and this is not about life. You’re acting like 
12 See Eileen Joy, “Reading Leo Bersani: A Retrospec-
tive,” In The Middle, June 2011, 2009: http://www.inthe 
medievalmiddle.com/2009/06/reading-leo-bersani-retro 
spective.html. 
13 See Leo Bersani and Ulysse Dutoit, “One Big Soul 
(The Thin Red Line),” in Bersani and Dutoit, Forms of 
Being: Cinema, Aesthetics, Subjectivity (London: British 
Film Institute, 2004), 124–178. See also Eileen A. Joy, 
“The Signs and Location of a Flight (or Return?) of Time: 
The Old English Wonders of the East and the Gujarat 
Massacre,” in Jeffrey Jerome Cohen, ed., Cultural Di-
versity in the British Middle Ages: Archipelago, Island, 
England (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 209–
229. 
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we’re supposed to read Bersani for life.” And I 
thought: we’re NOT supposed to read Bersani—
and let’s face it, theory more generally—for LIFE? 
Fuck: how come no one TOLD me that? It was a 
funny (and frankly, infuriating) moment, but also 
one that convinced me more than ever: um, yes, 
theory is for life: DUH! We read theory—whether 
Derrida, Foucault, Bersani, Jane Bennett, Graham 
Harman, Roland Barthes, Fradenburg, and I could 
go on—for life: for LIFE! So I relate this anecdote 
to also say that Fradenburg’s scholarship isn’t just 
about Chaucer or medieval literature or even psy-
choanalytic and evolutionary approaches to litera-
ture more broadly; it’s about life, it’s about how 
we, in her own words,  
 
need knowledge of how to do things every 
day in every way in our real environments; 
and we are not yet very close to eliminat-
ing the contingency and changefulness of 
living.  When it comes to talking, listening, 
courting, negotiating, playing basketball, 
playing the violin, making peace, leading 
an organization, the humanities teaches us 
how to live successfully—how to adapt to, 
and (re-)create, our circumstances, by see-
ing more keenly, hearing more polyphoni-
cally, interpreting more humbly, richly and 
carefully, speaking to each other more 
persuasively, and much, much more.14 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14  Aranye Fradenburg, “Frontline: The Liberal Arts of 
Psychoanalysis,” The Journal of the American Academy 
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Relationality, intersubjectivity, aliveness, resili-
ence, care of the (confabulated) self and also of 
others, playfulness, healing, the arts of living, and 
thriving seem, increasingly, to be the key watch-
words and concerns of Fradenburg’s work, and at 
the same time, the so-called “literary” mode is 
still central to these concerns, such that, 
Interpretation and relationality depend on 
one another because all relationships are 
unending processes of interpretation and 
expression, listening and signifying. In 
turn, sentience assists relationality: we 
can’t thrive and probably can’t survive 
without minds open to possibility, capable 
of sensing and interpreting the tiniest 
shifts in, e.g., pitch and tone.15 
Although it may seem, that in some of her recent 
writings, Fradenburg has been turning more to-
ward biological and cognitive studies and away 
from a concentrated focus on medieval literature, 
per se, her essay “Living Chaucer” tells a different 
story about a long and warm companionship with 
Chaucer in which the “literary friendship” Fraden-
burg feels for Chaucer “is an attachment his work 
actively solicits, to a degree and in ways unique 
to his corpus but consistent both with premodern 
of Psychoanalysis and Dynamic Psychiatry 39.4 (2011): 
589–609. 
15 Fradenburg, “The Liberal Arts of Psychoanalysis.” 
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and contemporary understandings of the signifier 
and its role in intersubjective, hence also political 
and social, process.”16 Therefore, Chaucer’s poet-
ry is central to Fradenburg’s thinking on some-
thing she has written eloquently about before in 
numerous pieces, and also expressed in her essay 
“(Dis)Continuity: A History of Dreaming,” where 
she writes that, “we all live in many different 
times; different times live on in us and our prac-
tices,”17  and therefore, with regard to literature 
(Chaucer’s poetry, for example) and its role in 
personal and social mental life, we might say, 
following Fradenburg, that it enables a “shared 
attention,” which is a form of sociality productive 
of progressive change in history. Literature is also, 
by its very nature, playful, and thus crucial, as 
Fradenburg writes, to the sorts of becomings that 
enable important psychic transformations: 
Play values experimentation. When we 
play, we are more open to the new, from 
within and without. We become ‘‘neo-
philes’’ and innovators, making active use 
of our imaginations. Playing and pretend-
ing are crucial to the becomings of living 
creatures, to adaptation and behavioral 
flexibility; . . . Play teaches ‘‘vital skills’’; it 
is transformative and transforming. We can 
neither thrive nor survive without it. And it 
16 Fradenburg, “Living Chaucer,” 41. 




is highly contagious, a powerful medium of 
affect transmission.18 
This resonates with Joan Retallack’s argument—
with which I am in more than warm agreement—
that, “To become adult in our culture (which for 
most of us means to become compliantly produc-
tive) is . . . to be increasingly disabled for the 
kinds of humorous and dire, purposeful play that 
creates geometries of attention revelatory of si-
lences in the terrifying tenses that elude official 
grammars.”19  
Perhaps the most important aspect of 
Fradenburg’s “Living Chaucer” essay is its em-
phasis on the idea that authors, texts (and the 
textual objects enclosed and projected therein), 
and readers form somatic-affective, and thus, 
inter-subjective assemblages and signifying net-
works over time, and what this means is that 
Chaucer’s words ‘‘live on’’ because the 
patterns they create really do change our 
minds and bodies. I believe this viewpoint 
to be a helpful alternative to our perennial 
question about whether we are represent-
ing the past rightly. Whatever representa-
tions of the English past we fashion, they 
are all in part the result of changes 
wrought in us, consciously and noncon-
18 Fradenburg, “Living Chaucer,” 57. 
19 Joan Retallack, The Poethical Wager (Berkeley: Uni-
versity of California Press, 2003), 62. 
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sciously, by living with Chaucer. The signi-
fiers of the past are in us, whether we un-
derstand them ‘‘rightly’’ or not; we will 
never be certain what they mean, but we 
will certainly have been possessed by 
them. And our possession by (and of) past 
signifiers further transforms their range of 
meanings.20  
 
Further, “symbols enable living process. Or, to 
put it another way, living is an art,”21 and litera-
ture forms one very important component of what 
might be called shared sentience (something I 
argue for myself in work on reading vis-a-vis vari-
ous object-oriented philosophies), 22 one that 
would be woefully impoverished and less able to 
transform itself in positive, open-ended ways, 
without poetry, without literature and other fine 
arts. Those of us who work in the humanities, it 
seems to me (and urged by Fradenburg’s and 
others’ thought), must never stop laboring and 
fighting to stress this point, which might also be 
put like this: Living is an art; the arts are crucial for 
living. Our scholarly work, also—and this cannot 
be stressed enough—is also an art, if we could 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Fradenburg, “Living Chaucer,” 45. 
21 Fradenburg, “Living Chaucer,” 45. 
22 See, for example, Eileen A. Joy, “Weird Reading,” 
Speculations IV (2013): 28–34, and “Like Two Autistic 
Moonbeams Entering the Window of My Asylum: Chau-
cer’s Griselda and Lars von Trier’s Bess McNeill,” 
postmedieval 2.3 (2011): 316–328. 
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just better grasp and practice this fact. We do not 
just study and write about the literary arts, but 
rather, extend and reinvent and multiply them in 
“our own words,” our own styles, our own idioms. 
Form matters and plays no little part in how 
things turn out. 
“Living Chaucer,” similar to Fradenburg’s 
book Staying Alive, is extraordinary for the ways 
in which it brings together neuroscience (with its 
concepts of neuroplasticity and mirror neurons), 
evolutionary and behavioral biology, studies of 
animal communication, psychoanalysis (Freud on 
mourning and melancholia, D.W. Winnicott on 
play), and medieval philosophy, among other 
subjects, to ultimately argue for literature, and 
Chaucer’s poetry especially, as a form of thera-
peutic care and counter-melancholic “working 
through,” enabled through a shared attention 
that is always about the process more so than the 
end, or finish, of anything. Chaucer himself, 
through his poetry, is a kind of “premodern psy-
chologist” whose continual suspension of so-
called final meanings creates what Fradenburg 
describes as a “friendly” liminal clearing in which 
so-called self-knowledge can really only be ac-
cessed communally, or in the company of good 
listener-conversationalists with a predisposition to 
welcome the Other (like Chaucer himself!). Through 
Chaucer’s art, we undo our isolation and move 
closer to the sort of fellowship so crucial for living, 
and for thriving (together). As Fradenburg herself 
puts it, in what for me is the most moving line of 
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the essay, and worth bracketing, 
 
What enables us to risk change is the feel-
ing that we are understood and (therefore) 
accompanied.23 
 
In the final analysis, as Fradenburg herself 
avers, play and shared attention are so important 
to so many species, including humans, that they 
may even be an end in themselves. We might also 
call this learning, or the university: the endless 
(playful, but also at times, sorrowful) processes we 
must commit ourselves to, with their open-ended 
(Chaucerian) mutliplicity of perspectives, and their 
cultivation of the non-utilitarian arts of life which 
may have more to do with personal and social 
well-being than we have previously imagined. For 
this, and many other reasons, Fradenburg’s work 
hails us to this inter-temporal pedagogical-artistic 
project, and asks us, not just to innovate our 
scholarship accordingly, but to reclaim the hu-
manities itself as the site of care and healing, and 
thus, of love itself, especially when we understand 
love (as I do), in Lauren Berlant’s terms, as a form 
of “emotional time,” where “it is possible to value 
floundering around with others whose attention-
paying to what’s happening is generous and 
makes liveness possible as a good, not a 
threat.”24 Fradenburg’s work is itself that sort of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Fradenburg, “Living Chaucer,” 60. 
24 Lauren Berlant, “Starved,” in After Sex? On Writing 
Since Queer Theory, eds. Janet Halley and Andrew 
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generous attention-paying, by which we are en-
riched, enlivened, and most marvelously of all, 
accompanied. 









1: More Blue Doors 
 





When, in late September of 1990 and a new 
graduate student, I first presented myself in the 
Sankey Room on the 4th floor of South Hall (argu-
ably the ugliest building on UCSB’s campus), I 
was on my 3rd doctoral program in as many dis-
ciplines, and rather feeling the strain. Over the 
course of the preceding six years, I had begun a 
PhD in medieval history at UCLA, leaving after a 
single quarter; I had begun another in Systematic 
Theology/Ethics at Berkeley’s Graduate Theologi-
cal Union, leaving after the M.A. I’d learned a lot; 
but I’d developed a love/hate relationship with 
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academic medievalism. Here to give it another 
go, I felt unsure that I would thrive in the field.  
On that late-September day, at that first cof-
fee hour for newbies, I met Aranye (then Louise) 
Fradenburg in the flesh, the star feminist medie-
valist, herself recently wooed away from the shady 
groves of Dartmouth to the quonset huts of 
UCSB. (Current and former occupants of South 
Hall will want me to note that those huts are 
perched on the loveliest of bluffs, overlooking the 
Pacific, and in view of the purply California 
Coastal Range.) I buttonholed Aranye with the 
clearly aspirational, if also anxious, exclamation: 
“I’m a medievalist!” (“Me, too!” she replied, with 
characteristic kindness). 
Within a week or so of our meeting, she had 
painted her office door a beautiful shade of pow-
der blue. Aranye’s blue door stood out amid an 
ugly expanse of identical office portals in yellow-
grey reminiscent of mid-century Soviet utility. 
That blue door staked a vivid aesthetic and insti-
tutional alternative, claiming the worth of appar-
ently superfluous matters like door color. Painting 
it, in the pre-quarter hubbub, probably took time 
away from what some would have us see as other 
“crucial” things; it also wagered time, labor, and 
imagination on well-being for the institution as 
well as those lives lived within it. 
These memories—Aranye’s blue door; her 
early welcome—revive as I conjure what it meant 
to read, in class only a few weeks later, the final 
passage from the essay, “Voice Memorial: Loss 
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and Reparation in Chaucer’s Poetry.” Herself, 
circa 1990: 
 
If we can grieve for our particular losses, 
and admit futurity to our interpretations, 
we can perhaps begin to outline an alter-
native to the hermeneutics of transcend-
ence. In doing so we could perhaps rec-
ognize that the seeking of community in 
the form of undifferentiated . . . unions 
predicated on identity can never be any-
thing other than a defense against loss; we 
could also consider the possibility that his-
torical community might be re-imagined as 
the promise of relationship between irre-
ducible particularities. . . . In doing so, we 
might be able to construct a medievalism 
that is politically compassionate.1 
 
I didn’t fully grasp, then, the brilliance of the es-
say’s multi-layered interventions, but this culmi-
nating paragraph simply knocked me out. I began 
to feel, sharply, the outlines of why I had left 
those other programs. I recognized that I’d 
sought an “alternative to the hermeneutics of 
transcendence,” in which we might “grieve our 
losses” and “admit to the futurity of our interpre-
tations.” And I wanted to consider the possibility 
of reimagining “historical community” in just such 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1  Louise O. Fradenburg, “Voice Memorial: Loss and 




terms. I hoped to be a part of the “we” trying to 
construct a “politically compassionate” medieval-
ism. This aim—Aranye’s and now, I hoped, mine, 
too—claimed, like the recently-painted powder-
blue door, a rich and inviting alternative. I felt 
charged-up: intellectually (what could a medieval 
studies look like without the anchor of anachro-
nism hung round its neck?), professionally (what 
historical particulars might I re-imagine?), and 
personally (I love that color! Where’s an ugly door 
for me to paint?). For five years that door remind-
ed me—every time I walked by it, or stopped in 
front of it, or hung out in its doorway—that here I 
would not just survive, not only live, but thrive. 
Graduate school still challenged (I lived on a 
shoe-string; failed a language exam; lost out on a 
fellowship), but Aranye’s blue door made me 
want to labor and to make things lovely, to read 
and to be rebellious, to attend to things essential 
and to things superfluous, to rejuvenate the halls 
or pages that I frequented. 
My own medievalist acts of renovatio trace a 
lineage to Aranye’s innovative interventions, and 
to that blue door. My current book project re-
thinks medieval traditions of newness, and rede-
ploys the wacky but utterly consequential medie-
val rhetoric of the newfangled in this spirit. I am 
interested in a medieval account of the New as a 
response to what seems to me today’s near unan-
imous agreement that the defense of the Univer-
sity should emphasize its capacity to foster inno-
vation. Trading in such imperatives, many take for 
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granted just what innovation entails, confident of 
when and how we recognize it: as the natural 
possession of STEM (Science-Technology-Engi-
neering-Math) fields? Pursued through disciplines 
thought to be especially useful? Unavailable 
through “traditional” (that is, humanistic) ones, 
the latter increasingly understood as expendable 
if enjoyable? 
Premodern ways of thinking about the new 
can challenge these assumptions in multiple ways, 
as Aranye’s own work regularly teaches us: via the 
creative power of an artistic “culture of copying”; 
by re-reading the influential distinction between 
“use” and “enjoyment” originating in Augustine; 
perhaps most crucially by rewriting the history of 
the premodern etymology through which curiosi-
ty’s links to cura, or care, came to police the bor-
der separating the essential things which deserve 
our care from those apparently inessential, super-
fluous things that should properly lie outside it. 
What I call my “newness” project feels especially 
urgent as I watch, from a short distance, as trus-
tees, administrators, and regents dismantle the Univer-
sity of California,2 unmaking this place where I once 
thrived. The current “crisis” (so-called) in Higher 
Ed has been pursued deliberately (which is not to 
say with deliberation). It began with cuts that date 
from the time that I was just leaving UC. Amid 
“crisis capitalism,” with its rhetorics of austerity, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 On which subject, see L.O. Aranye Fradenburg, Stay-
ing Alive: A Survival Manual for the Liberal Arts, ed. 
Eileen A. Joy (Brooklyn: punctum books, 2013). 
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decisions are made daily that put at risk or gut 
those things deemed superfluous, and for entirely 
specious reasons. And, everyday, students and 
faculty at UC (and elsewhere) fight to keep pro-
grams, faculty and TA lines, classes, and research 
plans alive. In that context we might note, as 
many did during the medieval centuries, that ac-
counts of innovation and of newness harbor im-
portant ethical ambitions. We might, that is, lend 
an ear to those debates, contested histories, and 
fanciful imaginings. 
So I end with what I take to be an ethical in-
junction: MORE BLUE DOORS, literally and fig-
uratively. Following Aranye’s innovative example, 
we will continue to intervene critically on the side 
of survival and for the living, while still reserving 
time for dreaming up newly envisioned experi-
ments in human thriving.  
2: Come Flourish with Me 
Critically Mixing Pleasure 
and Politics 
Randy P. Schiff 
x 
In his recent book Gardens, Robert Pogue Harri-
son offers an especially powerful engagement 
with Epicureanism.1 As I thought of Aranye 
Fradenburg’s recent critique that evolutionary 
functionalism disallows us to see surviving and 
1 Robert Pogue Harrison, Gardens: An Essay on the 




thriving in mutual relation with each other,2 Harri-
son’s study illuminated for me a continuity be-
tween Epicurus’s inspiring cultivation of the self 
and Fradenburg’s materialist blurring of art-nature 
boundaries, and also led me to recognize that a 
problematic Epicurean tendency to retreat is re-
paired by Fradenburg’s insistence on moving 
criticism beyond its disciplinary comfort zones. To 
appreciate the Epicurean anticipation of Fraden-
burg’s anti-functionalist exploration of artfulness and 
expressiveness throughout the animal world, consid-
er when Harrison turns to the work of W.S. Mer-
win and of Pietro Laureano to assert that agricul-
ture arose from gardening: reductive assumptions 
of exploitative human pre-history melt away, as 
we see it is enchantment and play that come first, 
only later to be reduced to secondariness by 
those cultivating the awareness that one can 
ground one’s economy in land appropriation and 
alteration.3  
 Harrison’s Epicureans are attractive critical 
precursors, concerned with cultivating patience in 
the present, hopefulness regarding the future, 
and gratitude vis-à-vis the past.4 However, if those 
2 See, for example, L.O. Aranye Fradenburg, Staying 
Alive: A Survival Manual for the Liberal Arts, ed. Eileen 
A. Joy (Brooklyn: punctum books, 2013), 21. 
3 Harrison, Gardens, 40. 
4 See Harrison’s recovery of Epicurean efforts to culti-
vate ataraxia, or philosophical happiness, in a discussion 
aimed at dispelling reductive readings of Epicureans as 
simply being pleasure seekers, in Gardens, 74–79. 
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of us shaping the humanities model ourselves 
after them, we have much to fear—for Epicureans, 
hopeless about the polis, sever all viable connec-
tions between their verdant academy and the 
political world of the city, retreating into private, if 
pleasant, gardens.5 Fradenburg’s resolute refusal 
to see art and play as secondary, luxurious pur-
suits, and her insistence on seeing surviving and 
thriving on one plane (coeval with each other), 
allow us to eschew the Epicurean procurement of 
philosophical pleasure through the sacrifice of 
political relevance. Fradenburg does not take us 
to the illusory safety afforded by garden walls, but 
instead encourages us to travel through a vibrant 
world energized by countless self-aware beings—
to embrace a cosmos full of busy, wonderful sen-
tience. Fradenburg’s cultivation of Epicurean art-
fulness highlights the material interconnections 
between us, other animal agents, and the territo-
ries we all mark and thereby create—and she also 
insists that humanities disciplines need to be ac-
tive outside of our intellectual gardens, avoiding 
the quietist mistake of walling off our discipline 
from sciences wrongly seen as occupying other, 
less ludic, more functional, spaces.6 
                                                                  
5 Harrison, Gardens, 72–73. 
6 On the humanities’ need to vigorously defend their 
place within the current academy, see L.O. Aranye 
Fradenburg, Sacrifice Your Love: Psychoanalysis, Histor-
icism, Chaucer (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 2002), 239–252, and also Staying Alive. 
STILL THRIVING 
10 
 Fradenburg’s recent work—elements of which 
I had the pleasure of seeing recently performed at 
the University at Buffalo, SUNY—wards off Epicu-
reanism’s depoliticizing impulse, while preserving 
its powerful emphasis on the primacy of the ludic 
and the ritual. Play must be taken seriously—
Fradenburg shows us through her compelling 
engagement with current evolutionary thinking, 
joy and art serve life by making life worth living.7 
Fradenburg’s critique of functionalism highlights 
the ways in which the humanities and the puta-
tively “hard” sciences each cultivate natural sub-
jects. Such a vigorous defense of the humanities’ 
institutional footing (as equal to the sciences, and 
also partners with them) should resonate in a new 
academic environment in which humanists’ de-
ployment of hard scientific methodologies is in-
creasingly paralleled by the emphasis on chance, 
creativity, and imagination in disciplines like phys-
ics, mathematics, and biology. 
Fradenburg insists that art is “biocultural en-
hancement”—that it is not something utterly new 
as representation, but that any art builds on or 
within patterning found everywhere in nature.8 
Much as constructivist physicists like Karen Barad 
reject binary correspondence models that alien-
ate investigators from the nature they observe, 
7 L.O. Aranye Fradenburg, “On Display: Showing, Hid-
ing, and Staying Alive,” paper presented as Juxtaposi-
tions Lecture, Department of English, University at Buf-
falo, SUNY, April 22, 2013. 
8 Fradenburg, “On Display.” 
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and instead see discursive practices as co-
constitutive of reality,9 so does Fradenburg un-
dermine the secure humanist picture of an interior 
self securely aloof from the exterior world: rather, 
exteriority is already there inside of us.10 This ero-
sion of the wall between self and other dovetails 
with the ethical task of breaching academic barri-
ers, enabling modes of political activism needed 
in an age in which public universities find them-
selves under acute, sustained siege. If, as Donna 
Haraway argues, the first step towards enabling 
all to flourish is recognizing one’s material en-
meshment with other agents, objects, histories, 
and fantasies,11 then Fradenburg’s critique of ex-
ceptionalist interiority encourages the enhance-
ment of already-existing affiliations with other 
players—human, nonhuman, and otherwise. 
In tracing patterning both within and without, 
Fradenburg pursues a key Epicurean practice that 
follows from the conviction that we, constructed 
of the same atoms as anything else in the cosmos, 
come and go as does any matter, with neither self 
nor soul transcending the same stuff of which 
anything—whether it be other animals, plants, 
                                                                  
9 See Karen Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway: 
Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of Matter and 
Meaning (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007), 132–
185. 
10 Fradenburg, “On Display.” 
11 See Donna J. Haraway, When Species Meet (Minne-
apolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008), 98–105. 
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plastic, or stars—are made.12 Rather than unset-
tling us, this knowledge should bring a renewed 
sense of kinship with others improperly thought of 
as absolutely Outside. Epicurus, however, follow-
ing a self-assured cynicism that Fradenburg ena-
bles us to recognize in evolutionary functionalism, 
counseled that philosophers retreat from the po-
lis. Fradenburg’s current work, which targets the 
misguided humanist practice of mimicking the 
pragmatism of the allegedly “hard sciences” 
while abandoning the humanities’ vital invest-
ments in play and pleasure, does not follow this 
unfortunate political path. Much as it is wrong to 
think that we can separate the historical objects of 
“serious” medievalism from the critic’s ludic ma-
nipulation,13 so ought we not think that the artful 
expressiveness traditionally studied by humanists 
has no serious place in such weighty political con-
cerns as negotiating environmental crisis or de-
termining how universities can thrive. 
 Fradenburg’s critique of functionalism links 
the humanities with the biological sciences in the 
collaborative shaping of an evolutionary thought 
that eschews reductive models (such as in most 
evolutionary psychology) that misread all actions, 
mechanisms, organs, and organisms as being 
simply adaptive. As Fradenburg powerfully re-
minded us in Buffalo, there simply is no functional 
12 See Harrison, Gardens, 74–75. 
13 See Louise O. Fradenburg, “‘So That We May Speak 
of Them’: Enjoying the Middle Ages,” New Literary 
History 28.2 (1997): 210 [205–230]. 
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explanation for why nightingales sing—and it is 
only when we get away from the misreading that 
there is always some adaptive reason for any be-
havior or any morphological fact that we can see 
how enmeshed we are, as agents who become 
parts of larger organisms as we variously mark out 
territories, in multiple strategies of play and self-
announcement. Most mutations are, Darwin 
makes clear, simply random; most changes are, 
individually, simply a blip on a screen filled with 
virtually countless genetic differences.14 Expres-
siveness and artful thriving are no less important 
than the mating or territorialist violence too often 
stressed by functionalists. 
 By moving us away from an unrelenting focus 
on pragmatic pursuits of zero-sum advantage, 
Fradenburg reintegrates artistic works within the 
larger web of natural processes—what Haraway 
analyzes as the complex dance of entangled spe-
cies.15 Fradenburg’s recent interest in blurring the 
distinction between human and natural media 
also performs crucial work in ecocriticism, a disci-
pline which, while having long ago recognized the 
need to remove the human from the epistemo-
logical center and to see the world more from the 
perspective of nature itself, has not always been 
as willing to see cultural productions and technol-
ogies as also natural. Our play is serious, too. 
                                                                  
14 See Stephen Jay Gould, Ever Since Darwin: Reflec-
tions in Natural History (New York: Norton, 1977), 12–
13. 
15 See Haraway, When Species Meet, 26–32. 
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 In recent conversations about a new formalist 
call for “surface” reading,16 I recall being espe-
cially delighted, considering the potential quiet-
ism of such a practice,17 with Fradenburg’s an-
nouncement that she is “not so ready to give up 
on the hermeneutics of suspicion.”18 One more 
aspect of Epicureanism allows me to see how 
powerful Fradenburg’s politics can be, especially 
when I think how easy it is, as I so often do, to 
give into the dark side of paranoid indictment of 
the powers-that-be. Always emphasizing habits of 
cultivation, Epicurus encouraged suavitas—a gen-
erosity and openness to conversation that, Harri-
son explains, was diametrically opposite to the 
intentional “boorishness” of the Cynics.19 I myself 
was able to thrive as a graduate student precisely 
because of the suavitas that Fradenburg cultivat-
16 I refer here to the thought-provoking February 2012 
Exemplaria symposium, “Surface, Symptom, and the 
State of Critique,” organized by Elizabeth Scala at the 
University of Texas at Austin; see http://www.utexas. 
edu/cola/depts/english/exemplaria/Information.php. 
17 Stephen Best and Sharon Marcus anticipate that their 
advocacy for “surface” reading could solicit accusations 
of their being “politically quietist,” in “Surface Reading: 
An Introduction,” Representations 108.1 (2009): 16 [1–
21]. 
18 I draw this quote from L.O. Aranye Fradenburg’s 
presentation at the roundtable “Rethinking the Catego-
ry of Love: Cognition, Emotion, and Biopolitics,” Mod-
ern Language Association Convention, Seattle, Wash-
ington, January 2012. 
19 Harrison, Gardens, 77. 
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ed both in the classroom and in our lives on the 
borders of the academy—an openness to multiple 
ideas and methodologies, a strong desire to en-
gage with arguments, and to see one’s ethical 
sphere as going beyond the university and into 
the public that informs it. I am very glad to see in 
Fradenburg’s recent work this suavitas moving 
beyond the human political world, into a vibrant, 
multi-species field of active, artful agents, which 
affords the humanities ever more opportunities to 
bring about more and more varied flourishing. 
3: Provision and Provisionality 
Julie Orlemanski 
x
When I chose the title for my comments some 
months ago, I was motivated by the thought that 
Aranye Fradenburg’s scholarship counts under 
the rubrics of both “provision” and “provisionali-
ty.” Which is to say, by the first word, that her 
books and articles, her talks and her pedagogy, 
sustain: they are provisions, victuals, supplies one 
packs for the journey, intellectual food-stuffs, 
nourishment laid in for times of want. And, by the 
second word, that the knowledge she’s produced 
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always comports itself in recognition of its partial-
ness, its own provisionality; she opens what she 
knows to the fact that it is conditioned and condi-
tional, contingent in the last instance—because as 
she writes in her essay “Driving Education,” in her 
book Staying Alive, as “mortal creatures,” we 
never get to the bottom of all “the forces that 
have formed us,” and thus we have a “responsi-
bility . . . to keep our knowledge disciplines open 
and unsettled.”1 Or, as she memorably wrote in 
Sacrifice Your Love, “group norms of our tech-
nique . . . both structure our desire and produce 
what counts as knowledge, as well as providing 
the seedbeds of change. But there is no other 
kind of knowledge than this; this is what 
knowledge is, and we make it.”2 Help for the fu-
ture and openness to what comes—provisional 
provisions, we might call it, or sustaining open-
ness; I carry her work with me: a paperback, bat-
tered photocopies. I carry her insights in mind as I 
make my way forward.  
 The terms “provision” and “provisionality” 
also strike me because they abut the territory of 
need—which in today’s discourse of neoliberal 
austerity has become, as it were, the safe zone. If 
you are declared needful, requisite, de rigeur, 
1 L.O. Aranye Fradenburg, Staying Alive: A Survival 
Manual for the Liberal Arts (Brooklyn: punctum books, 
2013), 32–33. 
2 L.O. Aranye Fradenburg, Sacrifice Your Love: Psychoa-
nalysis, Historicism, Chaucer (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2002), 50 (her emphasis). 
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then you’re safe; you won’t be cut from the 
budget; you won’t be quietly starved off the ros-
ters. (In a crisis, we are told, everything but the 
few necessary provisions will count as provisional.) 
The important matter, then, lies in how our needs 
are foreseen: who determines what is and will be 
required? “Provision” and “provisionality” derive 
from the Latin verb providere: to see in advance, 
to see beforehand, to take precautions. And this 
is the root of divine providence: that mode of 
foresight that would completely saturate time, 
contingency, and lack. The term “provision,” 
then, moves along two vectors: nourishing and 
open, as well as providential and paranoid: Aran-
ye has been involved with the critique of the lat-
ter, and the practice of the former. 
Within higher education, it is increasingly 
technocratic administrators who assign to them-
selves the task of mimicking providence’s totaliz-
ing scope. From a perspective that is “free” from 
the bias of any particular department, any singular 
liberal art, university administrations assert their 
executive authority to act in times of crisis and to 
determine what is actually needful. Of course, 
what is most often propagated is the institutional-
ization of this necessity for providential foresight 
itself—as in the widely disseminated graph mark-
ing the point in April 2011 when senior adminis-
trators in the University of California system came 
to outnumber faculty.3 
                                                                  
3 See “UC Administrators Crossed the Line,” Keep Cali-
fornia’s Promise, September 19, 2011: http://keepcali 
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The highly articulated, though ultimately un-
tenable, distinction between need and desire, 
between the minimum necessary for survival and 
the excess wasted on pleasure and enjoyment, 
has long been the object of Aranye’s analyses. In 
her 1999 discuss of “Needful Things” in Piers 
Plowman, she wrote, “The concept of need does 
much of its ideological work in the context of the 
severance of the law from desire. The distinction 
between need and desire permits the association 
of desire with superfluity and the law with necessi-
ty.”4 This cutting the distinction between need 
and desire ever closer to the bone is perhaps the 
primary gesture of austerity, the act that the per-
ception and the experience of crisis provokes. 
“Today, all around the world, the future of the 
humanities stands on the edge of a knife,” Aranye 
writes on the first page of Staying Alive. She con-
tinues, “The value of the liberal arts—its generous 
range of subjects and methods, its emphasis on 
teaching students how to think—seems to have 
plummeted.” Part of the business of Aranye’s 
book Staying Alive—as well as her recent essays 
like “The Liberal Arts of Psychoanalysis”5—is to 
forniaspromise.org/2001/ucs-administrators-crossed-the 
-line. 
4 Louise Fradenburg, “Needful Things,” in Barbara A. 
Hanwalt and David Wallace, eds., Medieval Crime and 
Social Control (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1999), 50 [49–69]. 
5 Aranye Fradenburg, “Frontline: The Liberal Arts of 
Psychoanalysis,” Journal of the American Academy of 
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offer alternatives to the neoliberal valorization of 
the vocational; that is, to describe the thriving 
that is fostered by speculative thought and by 
play: to provide a vocabulary for perceiving and 
recognizing modes of value that differ from mar-
ket logics. It seems to me that developing such a 
rhetoric is essential—especially because the dis-
course of austerity does not propagate itself ex-
clusively at the level of rational arguments, and 
therefore it cannot be countered exclusively at 
that level. Austerity’s propagation also has a 
powerful affective dimension. 
I will cite again Aranye’s essay on “Needful 
Things,” but in place of “the testing, disciplining, 
and managing of the poor” that she writes about 
there, I am going to read the sentence as though 
it were about education: “The testing, disciplin-
ing, and managing of education (and of the hu-
manities in particular) becomes a way to test, dis-
cipline, and manage the structuring of the 
subject’s and community’s relation to its jouis-
sance, its ‘inner antagonism’; is a way, in short, to 
endure, to surmount loss, to attain the fantasy of 
superexistence.”6  
It will never be enough to poke holes in the 
claims of austerity. It is important to generate the 
means for alternative forms of “groupification,” 
alternative provisions for the communities we 
seek to realize, and this is one of the reasons why 
I find Aranye’s recent writings so important and 
                                                                  
Psychoanalysis and Dynamic Psychiatry 39.4: 589–609. 
6 Fradenburg, “Needful Things,” 57. 
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timely, such an important provision in the long 
“crisis” and the neoliberal forms that perpetuate 
it. Indeed, in preparing my response chapter for 
Staying Alive,7 I was struck by the fact that aca-
demic-activist reflexivity makes up a vital part of 
contemporary humanistic practice. By “academic-
activist reflexivity,” I mean the claims about high-
er education currently being made, and made 
public, by students, teachers, researchers, admin-
istrators, and alumni, often writing in a variety of 
formats, from Twitter to journalism to mass-
market books. While these proliferating accounts 
of higher education differ from one another, they 
manifest a shared sense of dissatisfaction with 
neoliberal changes to academic life, or the ways 
in which higher education has been rendered 
increasingly amenable to, if not indistinguishable 
from, commercial and financial markets. 
These writings are activist insofar as they seek, 
explicitly or implicitly, to mobilize a collectivity or 
to catalyze institutional change. They pursue the-
se ends in part by giving an account of the kind of 
thing that higher education is right now—what 
configuration of persons, practices, moneys, atti-
tudes, affects, and technologies. Considered as 
both acts of information and of rhetoric, activist-
academic writings, I would argue, offer counter-
examples to the rebuke of scholarly “critique” 
proffered recently by, say, Bruno Latour, or Sha-
7 Julie Orlemanski, “An Army of Lovers,” in Fradenburg, 
Staying Alive, 51–73. 
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ron Marcus and Stephen Best.8 Academic-activist 
reflexivity is occupied with revealing the unacknow-
ledged circumstances that determine knowledge-pro-
duction—yet it does so with an expectation of 
helping to materially transform those circum-
stances. Its flexible decorum and range of media 
imply that higher education’s archive of self-
awareness is in effect constructing something 
new—new and still inchoate collective subjects of 
address. This archive is pluralizing and expanding 
what we talk about, and who we talk to, when we 
talk about higher ed. 
Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s “Paranoid Reading 
and Reparative Reading” remains the most pow-
erful challenge to scholars’ apparent faith in the 
efficacy of critical knowledge. This famous essay 
is, among other things, a call for the tactical anal-
ysis of how knowledge empowers the particular 
communities we belong to, or fails to empower 
them. The queries Sedgwick posed deserve to be 
asked anew: “What does knowledge do—the 
pursuit of it, the having and exposing of it, the 
receiving again of knowledge one already knows? 
How, in short, is knowledge performative, and 
how best does one move among its causes and 
                                                                  
8 See, for example, Bruno Latour, “Why Has Critique 
Run Out of Steam? From Matters of Fact to Matters of 
Concern,” Critical Inquiry 30.2 (2004): 225–248, and 
Sharon Marcus and Stephen Best, “Surface Reading: An 
Introduction,” Representations 108.1 (2009): 1–21. 
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effects?”9 The recent wave of activist-academic 
self-articulations, in which Aranye’s writings partic-
ipate, moves toward what seem to me the right 
sorts of answers to Sedgwick’s questions: answers 
that are local, affective, provisional, and tactical. 
In a climate of generalized crisis, these speech-
acts speculatively address new constituencies for 
higher education. 
I want to close by thanking Aranye for the in-
tellectual provisions that her thought and work 
have been, sustaining victuals for the task of 
thinking—and to thank her for that self-aware 
provisionality that acts to hold her works open to 
new readers and new futures. I also want to ex-
press my support for the project of activist-
academic writing in which her most recent work 
participates, and the new and newly mobilized 
communities of higher education that the dis-
course promises to constitute.  
9 Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, “Paranoid Reading and Re-
parative Reading, or, You’re So Paranoid You Probably 
Think This Essay Is About You,” in Sedgwick, Touching 
Feeling: Affect, Performativity, Pedagogy (Durham: 








4: Critical Thriving 
Chaucer, the Nun’s Priest’s Tale  







During the mid-1990s as a Teaching Assistant at 
the Universty of California in Santa Barbara, I had 
an experience I wish all medievalists could have: 
listening to a large lecture course on the Canter-
bury Tales delivered by Aranye (then Louise) 
Fradenburg. I was drawn to Santa Barbara’s PhD 
program because of Arayne’s astonishing oppositional 
readings of the Wife of Bath’s Tale, the Prioress’s 
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Tale, the Manciple’s Tale and other texts.1  But 
little did I know the knowledge I would gain from 
her accessible yet unfailingly brilliant undergradu-
ate lectures on Chaucer. One such lecture was on 
the Nun’s Priest’s Tale. We are accustomed to 
think of that text as Chaucer’s most slippery tale. 
In Charles Muscatine’s classic formulation, “the 
shifting style and the succession of topics” cov-
ered by Chaucer “never rest long enough to 
serve a single view or a single doctrine or an unal-
terable judgment.”2 More recently but in a similar 
vein, Peter Travis writes that the tales Menippean 
satire tends “to unravel and deconstruct the total-
izing patterns of thinking that are distinctive to 
certain traditional discourses,” so much so that it 
seems “absolutely unreadable.”3 Aranye, howev-
er, located at the core of the tale a single inter-
pretation, one that distilled for Santa Barbara stu-
dents the stakes of this challenging narrative. In 
keeping with the coincidence of her lecture with 
Thanksgiving break—a holiday centered on eat-
1 See, for example, Louise O. Fradenburg, “Criticism, 
Anti-Semitism and the Prioress’s Tale,” Exemplaria 1 
(1989): 69–115; “The Wife of Bath’s Passing Fancy,” 
Studies in the Age of Chaucer 8 (1986): 31–58; “The 
Manciple’s Servant Tongue: Politics and Poetry in the 
Canterbury Tales,” ELH 52.1 (1985): 85–118. 
2 Charles Muscatine, Chaucer and the French Tradition: 
A Study in Style and Meaning (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1957), 242. 
3 Peter Travis, Disseminal Chaucer: Rereading the Nun’s 
Priest’s Tale (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame 
Press, 2010), 340. 
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ing a bird—she pointed out to the class how 
Chaucer, in narrating Chanticleer’s escape from 
the fox, tells a tale about how not to be eaten. 
Like latter- day beast fables about Bugs Bunny or 
the Road Runner, the Nun’s Priest’s Tale is about 
nothing less than staying alive. Chanticleer, 
moreover, emerges from his ordeal a better, can-
nier, and more clear-sighted bird than before, 
having learned from his encounter with the fox to 
no longer allow flattery to fool him. 
Chanticleer’s experience is a lesson Chauceri-
ans might take to heart, as we all are faced right 
now with a direct threat to Chaucer’s institutional 
valuation by “the world’s largest scholarly society 
in the humanities,” the Modern Language Associ-
ation.4 Recently the MLA has proposed lumping 
all three medieval English MLA divisions into one 
“Early English” division, a move that would elimi-
nate the current division on Chaucer. The MLA’s 
effort to consolidate English divisions (in both 
medieval and other periods) appears to be moti-
vated by a desire for institutional vitality based 
upon a commendably progressive and liberal 
multiculturalism. A March 28, 2013 email sent to 
the Chaucer Division executive committee by 
MLA President Marianne Hirsch and MLA First 
Vice President Margaret Ferguson alludes to “the 
disproportionate number of divisions in English in 
relation to other fields like African and East 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Marianne Hirsch, “Of America,” MLA Commons, April 




Asian,” and to possible “new comparative divi-
sions on hemispheric, Atlantic, Mediterranean, 
Pacific, Indian Ocean, and indigeneity.” In her 
presidential column in the Summer 2013 MLA 
Newsletter, Hirsch writes that she finds “the 
MLA’s imperial ‘of America’ troubling and the 
split between English and ‘foreign’ languages 
frustrating.”5 Hirsch’s references in the letter to 
the fact that “the humanities are neglected and 
underfunded in the age of economic globaliza-
tion” and to “numerous planetary networks of 
intellectual exchange” the MLA has yet to en-
gage, makes explicit a theory of how a more 
democratic and inclusive attention to “un-
derrepresented world languages” would enliven 
and enrich an MLA suffering from widespread 
austerity policies.6 
There is much to commend in Hirsch’s pro-
posal. But should she bemoan the gap between 
English and “foreign” languages? Is Hirsch cor-
rect to desire a thriving international MLA multi-
tude? Following Alain Badiou’s critique of Gilles 
Deleuze (the “philosopher of the thriving rhizoma-
tic multitude”), Slavoj Žižek has queried the em-
brace in recent decades of a proliferation of di-
verse subjectivities, political and sexual. 7  Žižek 
points out that “apropos of today’s multicultural-
5 Hirsch, “Of America.” 
6 Hirsch, “Of America.” 
7 Slavoj Žižek, Did Somebody Say Totalitarianism? Five 
Interventions in the (Mis)Use of a Notion (London: Ver-
so, 2002), 269. 
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ist celebration of the diversity of lifestyles, . . . this 
thriving of differences relies on an underlying 
One: on the radical obliteration of Difference, of 
the antagonistic gap.”8 To posit a thriving prolif-
eration of linguistic positions, that is, is to create a 
medium or container whose absence of antago-
nism—a supposed easy-going roominess—allows 
all those positions to circulate, but also obliterates 
the dyad or binary necessary to engage differ-
ence. The proliferation of multiplicity and diversity 
ultimately leads us to sameness and similitude. I 
cite Žižek’s critique of the thriving multicultural 
multitude, not because I am against multicultural-
ism and diversity, but because I think that the 
thriving of the academy depends upon its reten-
tion of a searching analytical approach. As the 
MLA expands—and of course it should—to en-
compass an ever more diverse and larger number 
of literary perspectives, it’s crucial to approach 
those literatures with not so much a celebratory 
but a critical eye.  
Why, though, should Chaucer stay alive? How 
might the Nun’s Priest’s Tale provide us with a 
rationale for retaining the MLA Chaucer division? 
We might respond to such questions by demon-
strating how the father of English poetry antici-
pates the very proliferation of difference Hirsch 
seeks. We could highlight, for example, the lin-
guistic heterogeneity of the tale, which mixes 
Latin maxims and Old French interjections into its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Žižek, Did Somebody Say Totalitarianism?, 238. 
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Middle English. And, following the lead of critics 
like Peter Travis, we could cite other multiplicities 
present in the tale. This most self-conscious of 
narratives contains aspects of virtually all of the 
other Canterbury Tales; immanent in the tale is a 
heterogeneous crowd of possible perspectives, 
valences, subjectivities and organisms (from hu-
mans to birds, butterflies and even mermaids). 
But contrary to Travis, I would like to return to 
Fradenburg’s insight and ask if the slippery multi-
plicity of the Nun’s Priest’s Tale is the means by 
which Chaucer the poet—like the cock—stays 
alive? If, as Fradenburg puts it, sovereignty can 
deploy “multiplicity and difference” to “compel 
multiple desires to gather round its splendor,” is 
the Nun’s Priest’s Tale the prime instance of a 
Chaucerian poetic sovereignty (or sovereign mul-
titude) around which fascinated scholars have 
long gathered?9  
In other words, we shouldn’t retain the Chau-
cer Division because of the splendor attached to 
the medieval writer as the father of English poet-
ry. Neither should we enshrine Chaucer for how 
progressive—how proto-liberal or proto-multicul-
tural—his poetry is. Rather, by critically analyzing 
Chaucer and his oeuvre, we discover its function 
as a goad to rethinking pressing questions about 
identity and alterity. Aranye has modeled such an 
approach through her oppositional criticism of, 
9 L.O. Aranye Fradenburg, Sacrifice your Love: Psychoa-
nalysis, Historicism, Chaucer (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2002), 75. 
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for example, anti-Semitism and the Prioress; or 
class, gender and capitalism and the Wife of Bath. 
As such groundbreaking essays affirm, we should 
retain Chaucer insofar as critical—not celebrato-
ry—attention to his corpus continues to unhinge, 
transform, and trouble received ideas about be-














Volume 80 of The Minnesota Review (2013) 
contains an essay cluster proclaiming “The 
Medieval Turn in Theory.” In the introduction 
thereto, Andrew Cole observes that a great deal 
of recent scholarship is devoted to demonstrating 
“how medieval our modern theory really is.” As 
Cole points out, the contributors to the volume—
Kathleen Biddick, Amy Hollywood, Bruce Hol-
singer, Maura Nolan and D. Vance Smith—have 
taught us a great deal about postmodern theory’s 
premodern roots. Most recently, Cole and Smith 
coedited The Legitimacy of the Middle Ages: On 
the Unwritten History of Theory, a collection of 
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essays that explores the manner in which modern 
continental philosophy (i.e. theory)—including the 
work of G.W.F. Hegel, Karl Marx, Sigmund Freud, 
Martin Heidegger and Theodore Adorno—is shot 
through with medieval and medievalist discour-
ses. The volume’s title—“The Legitimacy of the 
Middle Ages”—constitutes a challenge to Hans 
Blumenberg’s The Legitimacy of the Modern Age 
(1966), which indulges in a criminal other-ing of 
the medieval era as a socio-historical cesspool out 
of which modernity triumphantly arose. The 
subtitle of Cole and Smith’s collection—“On the 
Unwritten History of Theory”—dramatically sugg-
ests that, to a large extent, the annals of inte-
llectual history utterly fail to acknowledge modern 
theory’s debt to medieval discourses. As Cole 
acknowledges in his introduction to “The Medie-
val Turn in Theory,” however, scholars have been 
engaged in this important work for some time. To 
give just one example, Bruce Holsinger’s The 
Premodern Condition: Medievalism and the 
Making of Theory (2005)—the title of which, of 
course, riffs on Jean-Fracois Lyotard’s The Post-
modern Condition (1979)—came out in 2005. I 
remember buying my copy at Borders, when that 
was still a thing. 
 The question, therefore, is not “why does the 
history of theory remain unwritten?” but, “why do 
we insist upon writing it and rewriting it?” The 
answer, as any one of L.O. Aranye Fradenburg’s 
students will readily tell you, is enjoyment. If the 
title The Legitimacy of the Middle Ages works on 
MEGNA: SACRIFICIAL ENJOYMENT 
 
35 
an allusive level, it also works on a purely literal 
level, insisting that the Middle Ages are legiti-
mate (i.e., worthy of our attention). As medieval-
ists, we enjoy pointing out the legitimacy of the 
Middle Ages to our friends, loved ones and, 
above all, modernist colleagues (whether they 
enjoy hearing about it is an entirely different 
question). We enjoy this practice for the alto-
gether obvious reason that it legitimates our 
somewhat esoteric life choices (or so we hope) in 
the eyes of the others for whose approval we 
desperately yearn. To be sure, we enjoy stressing 
the medieval era’s legitimacy because we actually 
believe that it is important for theorists to 
recognize the historicity of the ideology to which 
they cannot help but subscribe. How enjoyable 
could our chosen subject of study be, after all, if 
we felt it didn’t urgently require our intellectual 
labor? Of course, if we’re being honest with our-
selves, we enjoy asserting theory’s debt to pre-
modernity because medieval studies involves a lot 
of beautiful and unusual words, as does theory, 
and we seem really smart when we’re able to 
point out how much these two seemingly distinct 
lexicons actually have to do with each other. It’s a 
good thing that we enjoy it too, because, as 
Fradenburg points out, “we could not, even if we 
wanted to, stop creating, or more properly re-
creating, new prostheses of memory.”1 For Fra-
                                                                  
1 L.O. Aranye Fradenburg, Sacrifice Your Love: Psycho-
analysis, Historicism, Chaucer (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2002), 252. 
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denburg, a plethora of modern subjects—
hermeneutic theorists, to be sure, but also 
practitioners of games like Dungeons and Dra-
gons and the makers of popular movies such as 
Babe—engage daily in an incessant process of 
becoming-medieval that amounts to a sustained 
enjoyment of the past. Even when we criticize the 
past for producing the foundations of cultural 
biases that still plague us today, we enjoy doing 
so.  
 Many might recall the Exemplaria panel at the 
2011 International Congress on Medieval Studies 
in Kalamazoo, Michigan on “Surface versus Symp-
tomatic Readings,” or the subsequent sym-
posium at the University of Texas at Austin in 
February 2012 on that topic, “Surface, Symptom, 
and the State of Critique.” Although the original 
panel’s participants—Ruth Evans, Mark Miller and 
Bruce Holsinger—were varied in their enthusiasm 
(or lack thereof) for new, ostensibly less-skeptical 
modes of surface reading, for the most part they 
agreed that “the hermeneutics of suspicion” (by 
which Paul Ricoeur originally meant the skeptical 
mode of ideology-critique pioneered by Nietz-
sche, Marx and Freud) still has a vital role to play 
in medieval studies. Of course, part of the reason 
that we breathed a collective sigh of relief upon 
learning that we are still allowed to be suspicious 
is that we enjoy suspicion, whether we call it 
discourse analysis, ideology critique, or decon-
struction. Despite our best intentions, however, 
we enjoy totalizing too. Fradenburg puts this 
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point best when she states: “containment is a 
mode of enjoyment.”2 Early in her book Sacrifice 
Your Love: Psychoanalysis, Historicism, Chaucer 
(2002), she adeptly asserts that the theory of 
“subversion and containment” has become “some-
thing of an analytical cul-de-sac for Foucauldian 
new historicism.” 3  By pointing out that “con-
tainment” is a mode of enjoyment, Fradenburg 
disturbs the implicit morality under-girding the 
New Historicism, which almost always casts sub-
versive ideology as radical (i.e., good) and 
containing ideology as hegemonic (i.e., bad). 
Fradenburg neither cleanses containment of its 
oppressive history by associating it with enjoy-
ment, nor does she make enjoyment the utopic 
experience that subversion can never quite bring 
about. “Enjoyment,” she writes, “is what it is, and 
it can entail suffering for the other.”4  
If Fradenburg acknowledges that we can 
potentially enjoy the other’s suffering, however, 
she holds that we more frequently enjoy our own 
suffering for the other, which we perform through 
the art of sacrifice. For Fradenburg, both Chau-
cer’s culture and our own maintains a hyper-
economy of sacrifice, which is fueled by the Wes-
tern subject’s propensity to enjoy ceding time, 
energy, life and love to a higher order—the big 
Other. She neither disputes nor disregards a 
Nietzschean historiography that sees Christian 
                                                                  
2 Fradenburg, Sacrifice Your Love, 76. 
3 Fradenburg, Sacrifice Your Love, 76. 
4 Fradenburg, Sacrifice Your Love, 76. 
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ideology as effecting “a transvaluation of all 
values.” She does not deny the need to unmask 
perfidious ideology. Instead, she argues that 
when we do so we’re sure to find a kernel of 
enjoyment. Should we be suspicious of sacrificial 
enjoyment? Of course; but we should always keep 
in mind that the same enjoyment that fuels the 
hyper-economy of sacrifice also fuels the herme-
neutics of suspicion. Fradenburg’s work, there-
fore, does not invalidate ideology critique; but it 
also doesn’t allow us to consider the historical 
subjects who we study as mere dupes of ideo-
logy. She reminds us that they enjoyed asserting 
the legitimacy of their sacrifices, just as we enjoy 
asserting the legitimacy of ours. While the med-
ieval turn in theory is worth celebrating, therefore, 
it is not enough. Until we “own our stake in 
enjoyment,” as Fradenburg urges us to do, we 
can never adequately celebrate how truly med-
ieval our modern theory really is.  
CODA 
In the preceding remarks, I contextualize Aranye’s 
theoretical interventions alongside the work of 
contemporary critics who underestimate the ex-
tent to which enjoyment facilitates our writing of 
history and theory, in and out of the academy. 
Since writing this, I have been given occasion to 
reflect more deeply upon Aranye’s intervention 
into my own life, as did so many of the wonderful 
papers performances at the BABEL Working 
Group’s roundtable session on “Thriving” at the 
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2013 International Congress on Medieval Studies 
(Kalamazoo, Michigan) that gave rise to this 
volume. I’ve recently come to recognize how 
desperately I initially needed to benefit from 
Aranye’s thought. Her philosophy of enjoyment 
has taught me to complicate my natural cynicism 
without succumbing to an equally reductive 
optimism . . . or at least to try to adopt a less 
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Reading the poem that does not appear when 
the magician starts or when the magician finish-
es. A climbing in-between. Real.  
Jack Spicer, A Textbook of Poetry 
 
 
Arguing that medieval romance can be read other 
than as either a flight from history or a consolida-
tion of various reactionary desires, Aranye Fraden-
burg arrives at the seemingly simple proposition 
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that “sentience is always shifting.”1 I find the am-
biguous degree of transitivity in the gerundive 
complement ‘shifting’ particularly useful, suggest-
ing a variety of possible loci of sentience and a 
variety of afferent and efferent causes and results 
of the shifting in question: I shift in my seat, that 
cat shifts in its sleep, that lake shifted how I think 
about ecosystems, the continent shifted. Moreo-
ver, as published in 2004, this sentence has been 
for me a sort of prescient talisman—suggesting 
ways in which maintaining a commitment to say, 
reading poems closely would not mark one as a 
‘reactionary’ and in fact might even usefully serve 
the ecological and object-oriented commitments 
that have thickened medieval studies in the past 
few years. “[Medieval] romance,” argues Fraden-
burg, “generally focuses on the range and history 
of lived relations between subjects and objects 
whose sentient status is always up for grabs, inde-
terminate, but nonetheless ineradicable as resid-
ual, and whose uncertain sentience is both sub-
lime and abject, a matter of extreme curiosity.”2 
 Fradenburg links the shifting of sentience to 
wonder: “Like injury, wonder transforms sen-
tience; we feel it when boredom or ease change 
into maximum attention. Romance turns these 
shifts of sentience into a life-world.”3 Fradenburg 
frames wonder here as sensory-affective (we feel 
1 L.O. Aranye Fradenburg, “Simply Marvelous,” Studies 
in the Age of Chaucer 26 (2004): 25 [1–27]. 
2 Fradenburg, “Simply Marvelous,” 25. 
3 Fradenburg, “Simply Marvelous,” 6. 
REMEIN: LIVING / RIDDLE 
 
43 
it), but also as an element in a poetics of pro-
cessing the varieties of sentience-shifting by mak-
ing a space in which they become perceptible. 
Romance is here given pride of place as the poet-
ics behind such marvelous makings insofar as it 
obsesses over and motivates our attempts to in-
terface with something like the Real: “Romance is 
fascinated by how, and why, we move between 
different levels and kinds of attentiveness and 
awareness.” 4  The mid-century systems theorist 
Silvan Tomkins would suggest that such constant 
shifting of afferent and efferent information cur-
rents stimulates the affect he calls interest, which 
most basically motivates the re-compiling of in-
teractions between an organism’s systems mo-
ment to moment.5 What shifts my sentience is the 
shifting sentience, the sentience-shifting of the 
incompletely overlapping sentience-shifts going 
on all around.  
  So it is important to remember that the Real 
is not necessarily an undifferentiated annihilatory 
neant. And this is why turning to a certain linguis-
tic poetics can involve, even require, attention to 
a shifting cosmos. Fradenburg argues: “Through 
its operations of showing and hiding, art reveals 
the dimension of desire in economic activity. Sub-
liming and de-subliming the (sentient) objects of 
desire that circulate through the economies of 
group enjoyment are among the primary means 
                                                                  
4 Fradenburg, “Simply Marvelous,” 7. 
5 Silvan Tomkins, Affect, Imagery, Consciousness, Vol. 1 




by which romance provokes wonder.”6 The study 
of or turn to language, or the question of human 
‘access’ to the world as spurned by Object-
Oriented, Speculative Realist, and ecological 
thought,7 are perhaps both less of a barrier to 
either ecological or object-oriented thinking than 
they may appear. More troubling are assumed (repre-
sentational) ontologies of language and poetics that 
frame a turn to what language makes as the 
throwing up of an impassible barrier between our 
perceptual activity and an o/Other that is as inac-
cessible as it is undifferentiated. The prevalence 
of assuming that thinking about language means 
thinking about a poetics which can imagine lan-
guage-world relations only in terms of the yawn-
ing gap of signifier-signified marks a failure to think the 
shifting by which things made with language in-
teract with cosmos composed of inter-shifting percep-
tual systems.  
 Sentience is always shifting. Fradenburg notes 
that, “It is not easy to love the signifier; it is noth-
                                                                  
6 Fradenburg, “Simply Marvelous,” 16. 
7 See, for example, Ray Brassier, Nihil Bound: Enlight-
enment and Extinction (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2010); Levi Bryant, Nick Srnicek, and Graham Harman, 
eds., The Speculative Turn: Continental Materialism and 
Realism (Melbourne: re.press, 2011); Graham Harman, 
Prince of Networks: Bruno Latour and Metaphysics 
(Melbourne: re.press, 2009); Quentin Meillassoux, After 
Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency 
(London: Continuum, 2008); and Timothy Morton, The 
Ecological Thought (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2010). 
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ing more than an iterrable mark”8—and yet, the 
things that can iterate, the pitter-patter proto-
vibrations of the trace: these are emergent phe-
nomena not dissociable from the fabric of the 
physical universe (yes, this is a vulgarization of 
“the materiality of the signifier”). Especially we 
medievalists (what, with our penchant for allegory, 
our not uncritical historicizing) have an obsession 
with moving too quickly to the side of the signi-
fied, the represented, often even when trying to 
think ecologically; a failure to love not only the 
signifier, but the various materialities of the signi-
fier and their non-semiotic, non-mimetic, and non-
representational functions. We thus, in writing and in 
pedagogy, face an impoverishment of our critical 
lexicon for registers on which the illocutionary and 
the perlocutionary can be reasonably imagined to 
operate by a secular imagination. Thinking and 
making wonder, as the inter-shifting of sentient 
entities, can help. Taken as poetics instead of 
symptom, wonder appears as the conditioning 
techne of interesting and ethical relations with a 
varied cosmos: it would construct the provisional 
space at the intersection of a Venn diagram be-
tween the phenomenal field of two perceptual 
systems—a phenomenological architecture atten-
tive both to the logic of the psychoanalytic sub-
ject (driven and desiring), and to our increasing 
need to pay attention to what Ian Bogost calls the 
                                                                  
8 Fradenburg, “Simply Marvelous,” 12. 
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‘alien phenomenology’ of glaciers, foxes, or cit-
ies.9  
 Romance’s main strategy (according to Fra-
denburg) accords well with the sense of wonder 
as an epistemologically-oriented affect, usually 
related to rarity (i.e., value) and ignorance of 
cause (like the sort of wonder theorized by scho-
lastics and well-studied by Carolyn Walker Bynum 
and Lorraine Daston and Katherine Park10). But, as 
Liza Blake has been arguing, medieval and Re-
naissance poetry often makes up/implies its own 
discourses of physics and cosmology entirely al-
ternate to the scholastic conversation.11 And in-
deed, beginning as early as the Old English Rid-
dles, an alternative concept of wonder was also a-
foot—a wonder obsessed with the mundane and 
not resolved by an epistemological telos requiring 
a representational or semiotic/value-laden logic. 
 The text of the three-line Old English poem 
constituted by Riddles 68 and 69 of the tenth-
century Exeter Book makes for a perfectly brief 
example: “I saw that creature going on the path,/ 
she was ornamental, adorned [or worked over] 
9 See Ian Bogost, Alien Phenomenology, or What It’s 
Like to Be a Thing (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 2012). 
10 See Caroline Walker Bynum, “Wonder,” The Ameri-
can Historical Review 102.1 (1997): 1–27, and Lorraine J. 
and Katherine Park, Wonders and the Order of Nature: 
1150-1750 (Cambridge, MA: Zone Books, 2001). 
11 Liza Blake, “Early Modern Literary Physics,” PhD diss., 
New York University, 2013. 
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with wonders./ A Wonder happened on the path, 
water happened as bone” [“Ic þa wiht geseah on 
weg feran;/ heo wæs wrætlice wundrum ge-
gierwed./ Wundor wearð on wege; wæter wearð 
to bane”].12 Such a poem—a riddle you can solve 
as simply as ‘a puddle freezing over’—links won-
der and ornament to the point of tautology. Sen-
tience-shifting is here the result not of magical 
leaping across the abyss between signifier and 
signified, but, as the riddle narrates, of an orna-
mentation of the physical world. The poem posits 
and then adorns the wonder of the world/the 
order of the world as ‘ornament’ (recall that the 
Greek term cosmos harbors all these concepts). 
Riddles 31 and 32 begin with an even more tauto-
logical and more explicitly cosmological formula: 
“Is þes middangeard missenlicum / wisum gewlit-
egad, wrættum gefrætwad” [“this middle earth is 
in a variety of ways beautified / adorned with or-
naments”]. Of course, one could read this as an 
expression of Augustinian piety—attributing won-
der to the wondrous origin of the world in ‘God.’ 
But, as Mary Carruthers notes in arguing against 
an “over theologized” and “over moralized” me-
dieval studies, “Medieval art is not only explained 
by considerations of semiology and representa-
tion, mimesis . . . but also by persuasion” (on the 
                                                                  
12  George Phillip Krapp and Eliott Von Kirk Dobbie, 
eds., The Exeter Book, ASPR 3 (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1936). 
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level of somatic experience).13 Carruther’s advises, 
“In the presence of any artefact, our first question 
could then be not ‘What is it (and what does it 
represent)?’ but ‘What is it doing (and what is it 
asking us to do)?’”14 While these lines of OE poet-
ry may inevitably fall into a representational logic, 
they also have a non-semantic ornamental aes-
thetic force. The poem produces variation. Rid-
dling is this: not occulting a signified with code, 
but living and making with language the variation 
of shifting sentience beyond the measure of coding; 
taking hilariously seriously a recent joking tweet from 
Bruce Holsinger: “let’s see a big national rag pub-
lish a feature on the ANALOGUE humanities.”  
 As Carruthers also reminds us, medieval aes-
thetics valued varietas for its production of the 
sensation of mixture rather than the dignitas of 
classical rhetoric. As the mixture of sentience-
shifting, wonder keeps us interested by shifting our 
sentience in/as a modulating provisional space for 
entities on the edges of our sentience—the result 
of sensory-affective-effective kinetics and textures 
below—no, to the side of—the level of semiot-
ic/formal system—shiftings which constitute the 
variety of provisionally ontologically distinct enti-
ties we call the cosmos. “Any litany attests to 
13  Mary Carruthers, The Experience of Beauty in the 
Middle Ages (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 
13. 
14 Carruthers, The Experience of Beauty, 14. 
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marvels,” writes eco-poetics critic Jed Rasula.15 
Variation is perhaps the rhetoric of non-repre-
sentational force, and so of thriving sentience. 
The driven and desiring subject may face a trou-
bled ‘access’ to the real while at the same time 
perceptibly co-emerging with a variety of other 
alternate provisional perceptual systems on a 
variety of scales. Fortunately, the varieties of me-
dieval poetics—from Riddle to Romance—al-
ready teaches us, as medievalists, that the desires 
of object- and language-oriented thinking may 
not always coincide, but might interface.  
                                                                  
15 Jed Rasula, This Compost: Ecological Imperatives in 
















W. dreams, like Phaedrus, of an army of think-
er-friends, thinker-lovers. He dreams of a 
thought-army, a thought-pack, which would 
storm the philosophical Houses of Parliament. 
He dreams of Tartars from the philosophical 
steppes, of thought-barbarians, thought-
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